Case Studies
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Avalanche Safety Program
In northwest Montana, USA, near Essex, two vital transportation corridors, the BNSF Railway’s northern mainline and USA Highway 2, cross the Rocky Mountains through the avalanche-prone John F. Stevens Canyon (Canyon). Avalanches have threatened rail operations here since the late 1800s when the Great Northern Railway built the grade through these mountains. There are at least 18 avalanche paths threatening the rail. These can all produce large avalanches. Since the late 1800s, there have been at least 18 avalanche-related fatalities, numerous avalanche-caused derailments, and operational delays.
U.S. Highway 2 travels parallel to the rail grade in the Canyon and is exposed to several of the same avalanche paths. The road has been struck numerous times by avalanche debris, including in 1979 when a large-magnitude event destroyed a bridge. T. All paths that threaten the railway are located either entirely or at least partially within Glacier National Park. Ten snowsheds presently provide 5920 feet of protection along the rail grade. These snowsheds reduce exposure to avalanche debris but do not eliminate it. Historically, substantial amounts of debris have backfilled snowsheds or conveyed beyond the ends of the sheds onto the rail grade.
On January 28th, 2004, an east-bound grain train was derailed by two separate avalanches, with close calls for many personnel involved in the rescue of the train crew. A passenger train had passed through ahead of this train only a few hours prior.
Given the obvious risk from avalanches, the Railway sought a review of the incident, hiring David Hamre of the Alaska Railroad to assist as a consultant for the Railway. At the time, Hamre was an employee of the Alaska Railroad and an owner of Chugach Powder Guides, under which he did his avalanche consulting work. After assessing the situation the following morning, Hamre informed BNSF that their most viable option for mitigating the avalanche hazard was to utilize explosives to artificially trigger the remaining slabs or wait until snowpack conditions improved naturally. Since there was no permit for using explosives, the latter option prevailed until the cleanup was completed. Subsequently, a recommendation was made to BNSF management to create an avalanche atlas for the canyon. The atlas would define specific avalanche paths, each path’s terrain characteristics, and respective hazard to rail operations.
The atlas, titled “Avalanche Risk Analysis John Stevens Canyon Essex, Montana” (Atlas), was completed in December of 2004 by David Hamre and Mike Overcast. This work consisted of detailed avalanche path photos, a technical and narrative description for each of the avalanche paths, statistical information related to the rail’s existing avalanche hazard (Avalanche Hazard Index calculations), avalanche hazard reduction recommendations, and a table of historically documented avalanche occurrences in the canyon. Of note in the Atlas is the computed Avalanche Hazard Index of 110, which is a high enough hazard index to warrant significant actions (Hamre 2004). This work also contained a menu of options, each producing a quantified risk reduction and residual risk index value. The straightforward approach to risk reduction was to create an Avalanche Safety Program, which would reduce the risk somewhat but still leave the residual risk higher than industry norms.
Program & Railway Operations
Beginning in January 2005, BNSF contracted with Chugach Powder Guides and later with David Hamre and Associates, LLC (DHA), to create the BNSF Avalanche Safety Program (Program). This program has provided ongoing avalanche safety services (forecasting, training, and limited hazard mitigation) each year since then, typically beginning November 1st and ending April 15th. It consists of a team of avalanche professionals employed by DHA who work on contract with BNSF to reduce the avalanche risk. The team has also been responsible for installing many automated weather stations combined into an information backbone and implementing railroad-specific forecasting techniques that have since been adopted by other railroads.
Elements at risk consist of Railway maintenance workers, rail vehicles, freight trains, passenger trains, “Key” trains with sensitive materials, and passengers and crew on the rail grade. Maintenance work in the avalanche-prone areas occurs daily, with 25 to 35 trains (up to 33,000 containers per day), including two passenger trains, traveling through the terrain.
Initially, the avalanche program was developed to follow standards in the avalanche safety industry and use explosives to mitigate the hazard. This generated substantial concern among environmental groups, Glacier National Park (GNP) officials, and GNP’s parent agency, the National Park Service (NPS). In 2006, the NPS, in partnership with the Railway, began drafting an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to study the Railway’s proposal to use explosives on GNP lands to mitigate avalanche hazard. Adversity ensued, and it became evident that the recommended approaches for avalanche risk reduction so prevalent in other parts of the country would not gain approval. Even though the Railway paid for a large portion of the EIS work and a draft EIS had been issued, the BNSF withdrew from the EIS process in favor of starting over.
Nonetheless, GNP issued a final EIS and Record of Decision in 2008 stating that explosives use would only be permitted in an “…extenuating emergency situation…” The GNP’s recommended alternative was for the Railway to build almost another mile of snowsheds at its own expense (+/- $250,000,000) to protect the grade from avalanches. DHA was involved in the process and assisted the DEIS until BNSF withdrew their application.
Despite this setback, the Railway moved ahead with the existing avalanche program that relies on DHA for avalanche forecasting, operational restrictions, and closures to reduce the avalanche risk. As it operates, the program reduces the avalanche risk by approximately 50% but still leaves a higher-than-normal residual risk. This risk value is primarily a function of the high rail traffic volume, but the risk to personnel remains.
In 2022, Adam Clark, the BNSF Railway Program Manager for DHA, recalculated the Avalanche Hazard Index (AHI) for the railroad based on the forecasting and passive mitigations that were in place. This report served, and serves, as the impetus to make further mitigations to reduce the avalanche risk. These mitigations include operational restrictions at higher hazard levels and indicate the need for advanced forecasting tools to enhance forecasting efforts. These tools require placement within the highly regulated Canyon corridor. A permitting process that is not easy but not unfamiliar to DHA. To date, these advanced forecasting tools include using accelerometers on the uphill side of the rails to detect avalanche debris on the line. Future tools may include the use of Doppler RADAR and a communications hub for transmitting data more reliably out of the Canyon.
Program Forecasting
Based on the assessment of objective data related to observed and detected avalanche activity, snowpack structure from regular field visits to the avalanche paths, and weather conditions with data collected from multiple weather stations, Program forecasters produce avalanche information products related to avalanche conditions and assemble them as needed into an Avalanche Conditions Report” or ACR. The Hazard Level for the Canyon is calculated objectively using the RADS matrix, which Ted Steiner (the first BNSF Avalanche Program Manager for DHA) developed early in his tenure. Risk is scaled to given levels, with automatic risk reduction procedures implemented at each level, including a full-line closure.
The information provided conveys the probability of an avalanche and recommends safety precautions and restrictions for rail operations. Archived data related to Program observations is available online at avalanchealley.com.
Program Emergency Mitigation
In a natural avalanche cycle where avalanche activity poses a hazard to Railway elements at risk, a permit may be applied for with GNP to conduct emergency mitigation operations. The Program utilizes hand charges, helicopter delivery of explosives, or the Railway’s Daisy Bell to conduct these missions on a frequency of once every two or three years. This frequency is inadequate to provide critical stability information from explosive testing as almost every other avalanche program in North America does.
Program Avalanche Training
The Program also provides annual avalanche safety training for Railway employees and contractors. This focuses on general avalanche awareness, an overview of the Program, and specifically on avalanche rescue techniques for Railway maintenance workers on the grade.
